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THE MEANING OF EQUALITY AND THE
INTERPRETIVE TURN
ROBIN WEST*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The turn to hermeneutics and interpretation in contemporary legal
theory has contributed at least two central ideas to modern jurisprudential thought: first, that the "meaning" of a text is invariably indeterminate-what might be called the indeterminacy claim-and second, that
the unavoidably malleable essence of texts-their essential inessentiality-entails that interpreting a text is a necessary part of the process of
creating the text's meaning.1 These insights have generated both considerable angst, and considerable excitement among traditional constitutional scholars, 2 primarily because at least on first blush these two claims
seem to inescapably imply a third: that the interpreter of a text creates
rather than discovers the text's meaning. A text's meaning cannot constrain an interpreter, for the simple reason that there is no single meaning
embedded in a text to do the constraining; at best an interpreter must
therefore choose from a range of possible meanings, and at worst the
interpreter creates the meaning in the name of discovery or interpretation. In the constitutional context, the insistence that an uninterpreted,
pure, or original legal text (like any text) cannot constrain in any way its
subsequent interpretation seems to imply that the judge operates not in
the realm of law but in the realm of arbitrary power. 3 This suggests that
judges interpreting the Constitution are essentially creating its meaning,
and are therefore freed of any "textual"-and hence legal-constraints
on their power. The judicial interpreter becomes the constitutionmaker;
each case potentially occasions a rewriting. If the judge is not constrained by the singular meaning of the constitutional text, he must be
free to basically do as he pleases. Constitutional adjudication thereby
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. For a general introduction to these claims see S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
(1980). For an introduction to the legal literature, see INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A
HERMENEUTIC READER (S. Levinson and S. Mailloux ed. 1988).
2. For the angst, see Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). For
the excitement, see M. TUSHNET, THE RED, WHITE, AND BLUE (1988).
3. See Fiss, supra note 2. See also Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222
(1984).
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becomes, for better or for worse, an exercise of power rather than an
exercise in law.
As widespread as this belief is, however, the reaction of constitutional scholars to the two fundamental insights of the "interpretive turn"
in modern philosophy may be misguided. 4 Constitutional scholars who
are alarmed by the interpretive turn in jurisprudence assume that judicial
freedom from the constraints of the univocal, imperative meaning of
"the" constitutional text implies judicial lawlessness. But the conclusion
of lawlessness from hermeneutic insights simply does not follow. That
judges may be free of the constraining influence of an illusion-the illusion that a text has a singular meaning, either original or "plain," awaiting proper discovery-by no means implies that they are thereforefree; it
only means that the text does not operate as a constraint, at least to the
degree or in the manner traditionally thought. But it does not follow
that the judge is unconstrained. He may well be constrained, even if not
by the singular, original, or plain meaning of the text. Thus, even the
judge who is free (and feels free) of the illusion that the text has a single,
imperative meaning may nevertheless be "bound" by-and feel bound
by-any number of other constraints, stemming from his professional
role, his sense of ethics, his class interests, the expectations of a range of
various "communities," or, as I shall discuss in greater detail in the bulk
of this paper, his jurisprudential identity, and the social and moral role in
society that identity entails. That the judge is not bound by the intended
or plain meaning of the Constitution, as of any legal text, implies next to
nothing about the degree of freedom or constraint with which he decides
cases.
In fact, as I shall discuss in more detail in Part II below, most scholars who draw heavily upon hermeneutic insights, or who accept in some
fashion the basic interpretivist claims outlined above, insist quite strenuously that the judge is bound, or constrained, by some set of forces. Indeed, if anything, descriptions of the judicial process which deny the
existence of an objective and singular meaning of legal texts more often
vest the judge with too little discretion, not too much. The judge
emerges from some of these depictions as so utterly at the mercy of forces
over which he has little or no control, that the adjudication depicted by
interpretivists often appears to be ultimately as "mechanical" as that portrayed by the formalists, intentionalists, and plain meaning theorists they
set out to decry.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see why the misperception persists
4. For a lengthy argument to this effect, see Fish, Fiss v. Fish, 36

STAN.

L. REV. 1325 (1984).
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that the new "interpretivism" in the context of legal and constitutional
studies implies judicial freedom, and hence judicial lawlessness. There
are two reasons. The first is that interpretivists have not paid as close
attention as they should to the nature of the constraints on judicial interpretation-whether they be textual or nontextual. Debate has centered
instead around the claim that the intended or plain meaning of a legal
text cannot control its subsequent interpretation. The result is that there
has simply been inadequate attention given to the identification of
nonintentionalist and non-plain-meaning constraints on the judge's decision. The impression, or misimpression, this neglect has fostered is the
all-or-nothing claim that if neither authorial intention nor plain meaning
controls judicial discretion, then nothing does. The judge is either, in this
misguided dilemma, bound by the text's intended or plain meaning, or is
free to do as she pleases.
The second and somewhat more complex reason that interpretivism
seems to imply judicial lawlessness is that the constraints that interpretivists have identified are not constraints that satisfy the ethical and legalistic imperatives that drive traditional constitutional theorists toward
intentionalist and plain-meaning theories of meaning. 5 That the judge
who is unbound by a discoverable meaning of the constitutional text may
nevertheless be bound by dominant class interests, culturally embedded
constructs, unconscious bias, or even community morality, will hardly be
consolation to the theorist who sees in "law" the possibility of protecting
the individual against those very forces-the ravages of class, the ignorance or idiocy of dominant culture, the meanness or viciousness of
mainstream bias, and bigotry. To the degree that the traditionalist sees
law as a bulwark against arbitrary, random or whimsical judgment, the
interpretivists' identification of nontextual constraints on interpretation
might provide some solace. But to the degree that the traditional constitutionalist's insistence on a discoverable constitutional meaning is
grounded in the faith or hope that the power of law can protect us
against malevolent nonlegal forces-such as communal xenophobia or
class oppression-the interpretivists' identification of precisely those
forces as the relevant non-legal constraints on judicial discretion is very
likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate the traditionalist's anxiety.
The first purpose of this article is simply to expand discussion of
nontextual constraints on judicial interpretation beyond its present contours. I will assume the interpretivists' major premise-that judicial interpretation of the Constitution does not and cannot consist of
5. See infra notes 19 to 26 and accompanying text.
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ascertaining and applying either the plain meaning or the originally intended meaning of its authors. I will also urge, however, that the two
forces interpretivists have unambiguously identified as major constraints
on the judicial process-communal constraints on interpretive meaning
and class interest-whether or not correct, are certainly not exhaustive.
There is no reason to think that judges are not also constrained by other
forces, and that they do not retain some residual degree of freedom to act
against those influences as well.
I then want to explore the ramifications of one particular constraint
on constitutional interpretation which seems both incontrovertible and
politically unobjectionable, but which nevertheless (or perhaps for that
reason) has been underexamined in the constitutional and interpretive
literature. The meaning of the judicially discovered or interpreted Constitution, I will argue, is determined in part by the identification throughout the legal culture, and to a lesser degree by the mainstream culture of
the Constitution as a legal rather than political document, and as a law
for judicial, rather than legislative application. To the degree that we
identify the Constitution as a source of adjudicative law, judicial interpretation of the Constitutional text is constrained not only by the original
or plain meaning, as is insisted by intentionalists and textualists respectively, and not only by the ethical constructs, interpretive rules, class
interests, and ideological forces identified by interpretivists, but also by
jurisprudential conceptions of the nature of law. Obviously, if the Constitution is law, then it is not only a Constitution we are expounding, but
law we are expounding as well. Consequently, judicial understanding of
what the Constitution means is heavily influenced by judges' conceptions
of the nature of law-law is the general category of which the Constitution is an instance.
For this jurisprudential reason alone, in the hands of other nonlegal
interpreters in the political arena, the Constitution could take on, and
has taken on, very different meanings. Legislators and citizens, unlike
courts, are not constrained by the need to interpret, apply and enforce
the Constitution as a legal document. Whatever constitutional meanings
derive from constraints that owe their origin to the judicial forum to
some degree lose their force when the Constitution is interpreted in other
nonlegal fora. It is thus not surprising that the Constitution and its general phrases mean one thing to the Court and courts, and oftentimes
something very different to other sectors of the community. The Second
Amendment, to take an obvious example, clearly means something quite
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different to large sectors of the public than it means to the courts. 6 Likewise, the constitutional "right to privacy" has a different constitutional
status outside the Court than inside.
These differences may reflect differences in degrees of expertise. But
they also reflect differing institutional and jurisprudential responsibilities.
Citizens and legislators have different interests in the Constitution and its
phrases than do courts, and accordingly operate under different constraints. One of those differences is surely that for the Court and the
courts, the Constitution is law, and must be interpreted, enforced, and
applied as such-that is, after all, what courts do. This constraint does
not operate in anywhere near the same way upon citizens or legislators.
Consequently, citizens and legislators not bound by the duty of enforcing
and applying the legal Constitution may see very different meanings in its
general phrases.
In the first section below, I will quickly outline two "interpretivist"
descriptions of the adjudicative process which stem in different ways
from the basic interpretive claims sketched above. The first is that of a
group of interpretive scholars whom I will call the "postmodernists"-by
which I mean the neo-pragmatic and postmodern theorists most influenced by or responsible for the interpretive turn in constitutional theory.
I will take Stanley Fish as representative of postmodernism. The second
description comes from the Critical Legal Studies movement, and here I
will take Mark Kelman's work as somewhat representative. Critical
scholars no less than postmodernists are heavily influenced by the interpretive turn, but they have used it for very different purposes than those
of the postmodern critics.
As different as they are, I will argue, these two groups have much in
common. First, neither of them posit the bogeyman feared by the traditional critics of interpretivism: the untethered judge, unconstrained by a
binding legal text, deciding cases according to whim. Although both accept the major premise that the legal text does not possess a pre-interpreted, objective meaning there for the finding, both also describe the
judge as heavily bound by external forces. Neither the Fishian nor the
Kelmanesque judge decides cases according to "whim." I will then argue that both Fish's and Kelman's descriptions constitute only partial
truths. Their descriptions are valuable, but they err in their implicit assumption that they have in some sense described the panoply of extratextual determinants of the judicial decision.
6. An eloquent "citizen's interpretation" of the second amendment was recently provided by
Scarry, War and the Social Contract: The Right to Bear Arms, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 119 (1990).
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In Part II, I argue that, in addition to the nontextual constraints
identified by Fish and Kelman, the role of the judge places peculiarly
jurisprudentialconstraints on the interpretation of the constitutional text.
In Part III, I apply the argument to one particular constitutional text:
the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
II.

THE INTERPRETIVE TURN

Both critical legal scholars 7 and postmodern legal theorists8 embrace the basic interpretive insights sketched above-that texts have no
pure, uninterpreted meaning, and that the interpreter of the text consequently endows the text with meaning, rather than discovers its meaning.
Furthermore, both have offered descriptions of adjudication that depict a
far more constrained process than the kind of account most often
ascribed to them. The constraints on legal interpretation which they
have identified, however, are strikingly different.
Let me begin with the postmodern theorists. In sharp contrast to
most critical legal scholars, postmodern theorists typically insist that the
basic interpretivist claim-that the original text does not control its subsequent interpretation-does not imply, in the legal and especially the
constitutional context, a pernicious politicization of the bench. For the
post-modernist, there is indeed no discoverable, pre-interpretive, original,
or intended meaning to any text, notably including the constitutional
text. And, it is indeed the process of interpretation that confers meaning
upon texts, and judges are undoubtedly in the business of interpretation.
However, it does not follow that judges create constitutional meaning.
Judges are quite fully constrained. They couldn't possibly, even if they
set out to, decide cases on the basis of their own political whim. The
reason why goes to the heart of the "interpretive turn" itself.
The reason legal indeterminacy does not imply judicial activism, according to postmodernists, inheres in the nature of texts and in the nature of interpretation. Texts, to repeat a by now well-worn trope, come
"always already" interpreted. 9 A "text," according to the post modernists, is not simply the recorded intention of its authors-here, the fram7. For a general introduction to critical legal theory, see

THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASSO-

CIATION, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: ARTICLES, NOTES, AND BOOK REVIEWS SELECTED FROM
THE PAGES OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW (1986).

8. See generally S. FISH supra note I, and S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989).

But see Levinson, Law as Literature, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC
READER supra note 1, at 155, for a very different, and more political, understanding of the hermeneutic tradition and its consequences for legal interpretation.
9. S. FISH, supra note 1, at 303-71.
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ers. Nor does it contain a plain-meaning pre-interpreted-meaning.
Rather, a "text" is, definitionally, the embodiment of the stories, traditions, interests, desires and aspirations of the communities that have produced and interpreted it, and this is as true of the constitutional text as of
any other. Even if the plain or originally intended meaning of a text does
not constrain judges, then, this fully, always already interpreted text
clearly does; the judge cannot help but read the text in a constrained way
if he is going to read the text at all.
Thus, contrary to the fears of intentionalist and plain meaning advocates, the postmodernists fully agree with the traditionalists that the constitutional text constrains interpretation. The nature of the constraint,
however, is markedly different than that seen by traditionalists in the
plain meaning or original intent of the constitutional document. The text
does indeed constrain, but the "text" that does the constraining, for the
postmodern theorist, is only partly (if that) a product of its plain meaning or the intention of its author. The text that constrains is the "interpreted text," not the pure text, or the plain text, or the intended text, or
the text as put forward by its originators. This constitutional text is always already interpreted; as such, it is always already a product of the
changing and evolving stories, constructs, narratives, interests, desires
and aspirations of the communities that receive, use and live under it.
Those stories, constructs, narratives, interests, desires and aspirations,
therefore, are what constrain interpretation, and thus control judicial discretion. The judge is decidedly free of the original or plain meaning of
the constitutional text. But it by no means follows that he is free.
It bears emphasizing, however, that the postmodernists also agree
with the radical wing of the Critical Legal Studies movement that neither
intent nor plain meaning can possibly control judicial interpretation, and
hence judicial meaning. But they disagree over the consequences. To
somewhat reverse the point made above: even assuming, along with the
critical scholar, that the interpreter is not constrained by the originally
intended or singular meaning of a text-because no such thing exists-it
doesn't follow that the interpreter is not constrained by the "text."
Rather, the text that guides judgment is the "interpreted text": the text
as endowed with meaning by its community of interpreters. It is only
that text which can be read, or applied, or, in the case of law, enforced.
In the constitutional context, this means that the judge is indeed constrained by the constitutional text, but the text is not, and could not be,
the originally intended text or even the plain meaning text. It is the interpreted constitutional text that constrains.
The postmodernists' insistence that the text is "always already" in-
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terpreted implies a very different sort of answer than that propounded by
critical scholars to the spectre of unconstrained judicial activism that traditionalists fear is implied by the interpretivists' major premise that texts
lack a discoverable or even coherent original, intended meaning. The
postmodern theorist agrees with the traditionalist that the judge is constrained by the text, but disagrees that this binds the judge to a singular
and originally intended meaning. On the other hand, the postmodernist
agrees with the critical scholar that the originally intended text cannot
operate as a constraint on the judge, but disagrees that it follows that the
judge operates in the realm of pure and arbitrary power rather than law.
The judge, according to the postmodernists, is in a uniquely "mid-way"
position: vis-A-vis the original, or intended, or "pure" constitutional text,
he is free, but vis-A-vis the interpreted text, given meaning by the interpretive community in which it is located, he is quite fully bound. As he
is a member of the "interpretive community," he cannot help but remain
true to the "text's" meaning, where the text is thus understood. The
judge is both bound by the constitutional text, where text definitionally
includes the meanings ascribed it by the community of its interpreters,
and freed from the illusory binding imperatives of the Constitution's
plain meaning or its original drafters.
Thus, by insisting on the already interpreted text, the postmodernists remain true to the basic interpretive insights outlined
above-that the identity of the interpreter affects the interpretation, that
texts do not possess a singular, originally intended meaning, and that the
interpretation of a text is what creates its meaning-while avoiding the
apparently inescapable conclusion that the interpreter (here, the judge)
no less than the original author, thereby has a hand in the creation of
meaning. Interpretation does indeed bestow meaning on texts, but this
has no implications for the separation of powers: the constitutional text is
always already interpreted. The judge deals with, and ultimately decides
under an already interpreted text. Stanley Fish explains:
[R]eaders and texts are never in a state of independence such that they
would need to be "disciplined" by some external rule. Since readers
are already and always thinking within the norms, standards, criteria
of evidence, purposes, and goals of a shared enterprise, the meanings
available to them have been preselected by their professional training;
they are thus never in the position of confronting a text that has not
already been "given" a meaning by the interested perceptions they have
developed. More generally, whereas Fiss thinks that readers and texts
are in need of constraints, I would say that they are structures of constraint, at once components of and agents in the larger structure of a
field of practices, practices that are the content of whatever "rules" one
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might identify as belonging to the enterprise.10
The result in the constitutional context is a more sophisticated un-

derstanding of the complexity of the constitutional text, but a nevertheless utterly conventional account of the judge's role in applying it: the
judge applies the law. Interpretivism thus understood by no means implies that we are on the brink of judicial anarchism; quite the opposite.
Stanley Fish's comments here (as is often the case) are representative:
On my analysis, the Constitution cannot be drained of meaning, because it is not a repository of meaning; rather, meaning is always being
conferred on it by the very political and institutional forces Fiss sees as
threats. Nor can these forces be described as "mere," because their
shape and exercise are constrained by the very principles they supposedly endanger. And, since the operation of these forces is indeed principled, the fact that they determine (for a time) what will be thought of
as "public values" is not something to be lamented, but simply a reflection of the even more basic fact that values derive from the political
and social visions that are always competing with one another for control of the state's machinery.II

Critical legal scholars draw quite different implications from the basic indeterminacy claim that texts lack a single, identifiable, pure,
uninterpreted, or pre-interpreted meaning. Here, it is helpful to distinguish two rather different critical positions. For some critical scholars,
notably Duncan Kennedy, the absence of a textually generated pure
meaning does imply that judges have considerable freedom to decide
cases in line with their political convictions-and hence considerable responsibility for the moral value of the decisions they render.1 2 For these
critics, the interpretive turn does seem to imply that there is essentially
no weighty difference between the institutional roles of judge and legislator, of law maker and law interpreter.' 3 But this position is not particu14
larly representative of critical scholars generally.
10. Fish, supra note 4, at 1339.
11. Id. at 1346.
12. In one passage Kennedy describes that freedom in this way:
The judge cannot, any more than the analyst, avoid the moment of truth in which one
simply shifts modes. In place of the apparatus of rule making and rule application, with its
attendant premises and attitudes, we come suddenly on a gap, a balancing test, a good faith
standard, a fake or incoherent rule, or the enthusiastic adoption of a train of reasoning all
know will be ignored in the next case. In terms of individualism, the judge has suddenly
begun to act in bad faith. In terms of altruism, she has found herself. The only thing that
counts is this change in attitude, but it is hard to imagine anything more elusive of analysis.
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1776 (1976).
See also Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication: A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518 (1986).
13. See Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 564-65 (1982).
14. See M. TUSHNET, supra note 2.
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For others, and I think for most critical scholars, judicial construal
of legal texts is not determined by the original or plain meaning of texts,
but it is nevertheless heavily constrained. For these critical scholars, judicial construction of texts is heavily influenced by pretextual "interpretive constructs" that shape the way we read, and what we read into,
texts. The impression that we have reached the only textually permissible result in even an easy case is a result of our embrace, either conscious
or unconscious, of an "interpretive construct" that narrows our interpretive options when we confront the text. Kelman's description of his own
critical method in criminal law is illustrative:
By interpretive construction, I refer ... both to the way we construe a factual situation and to the way we frame the possible rules to
handle the situation ....
* ' * These constructs are sometimes unconscious techniques of
sorting out legal material and are sometimes consciously held political
or philosophical beliefs, although even the consciously held beliefs
function so that the users seem unaware of them .... [A] legal-sounding argument can be made only after a situation is characterized
nonrationally, so that the advocate seems able to deduce a single result
on principle....
... Legal argument can be made only after a fact pattern is characterized by interpretive constructs. Once these constructs operate, a
single legal result seems inevitable, a result seemingly deduced on general principle. 15
Although nowhere fully explicated, Kelman's "interpretive constructs" are markedly different from the constraints imposed by Fish's
"interpretive community." The constructs that predetermine interpretation for Kelman are nonprincipled, arational or irrational, grounded typically in class interest, unacknowledged, often unrecognized by those that
employ them, and are generally pernicious. They undercut what purports to be a rational, fair, and principled practice: the application of
general rules under a Rule of Law regime. Fish's interpretive community, by contrast, imposes constraints drawn from its openly acknowledged institutional and professional identity. Fish's constraints are as
principled and rational as the practice itself, grounded in the practice's
stated aspirations, openly acknowledged (although only when brought to
mind) and generally strikingly benign in their operation. For Fish, there
is "no need to worry": the interpretive turn is no threat to the values of
legalism, for the simple reason that even though "law" does not control
15. Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law 33 STAN. L.
592-93 (1981).

REV.

591,
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power in the sense hoped by intentionalists, the nontextual institutional,
cultural and professional forces that constrain legal interpretation emanate from our principles; indeed they are indistinguishable from our principles. For Kelman, unlike Fish, the indeterminacy claim seriously
compromises the ideals and principles that define legal and judicial
practice.
As different as they are, however, Fish's and Kelman's descriptions
of legal reasoning have two things in common. First, neither account
matches the nightmare vision of the whimsical judge that traditional constitutionalists fear from the interpretive movement. Neither posits a conscious, freely choosing, untethered judge, making decisions in any way
she wills. Second, and perhaps more significantly, both Kelman's and
Fish's descriptions resolve what seems to be a major problem with the
indeterminacy critique: why it is that the process of adjudication is often
felt to be determinate if it's true that the text from which it proceeds is
inevitably indeterminate. Both accounts, in very different ways and with
widely divergent political consequences, account for the perception of determinacy in the face of the reality of indeterminacy in a structurally
similar way. They do so by denying not so much the ultimate determinacy of adjudication-for both, again, adjudication is determined, albeit
not by law-but rather, by challenging the authenticity of the consciousness of judging: on both accounts the judge is more unaware than aware
of the true determinants of her reasoning. It is thus possible for the legal
text to be radically indeterminate, yet for the process of adjudication to
feel quite determinate. The judge correctly perceives her decision as
bound, and may sincerely believe the law to be that which binds her. She
is correct in her self-perception of her decision as determined. She is
wrong, though, to think that it is determined by the singular, originally
intended meaning of the pre-interpreted text. Her decision is determined, but it is determined not by law (at least as conventionally understood) but rather by forces of which she is largely unaware.
The third feature these two accounts share is more troubling. For
both Fish and Kelman the act of judging is so fully determined that the
judge herself becomes oddly de minimus-even irrelevant. Thus, for
Fish, the judge is not just "controlled by" but indeed "constituted by"
interpretive constructs and communitarian texts, and although the "text"
here is understood to include far more than the text's authors' original
intentions, it is nevertheless the communally construed text that is paramount. Neither writer nor reader exercise much power under this view;
it is the interpretive community, always already interpreting always already interpreted texts, which is the active agent in the process of creat-

462
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ing meaning, through interpretation. On Fish's account, the judge, as
reader, simply disappears:
[I]t is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the
reader, that produce meanings ....

Interpretive communities are made

up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading but for
writing texts, for constituting their properties...
...[S]ince the thoughts an individual can think and the mental
operations he can perform have their source in some or other interpreas
tive community, he is as much a product of that community (acting
16
an extension of it) as the meanings it enables him to produce.
Strangely and somewhat dissatisfyingly, on Kelman's account no
less than on Fish's, the judge's role is also peculiarly diminished,
although for very different reasons, and with far less complacent results.
While for Fish the judge-as-reader is bound by the relatively benign interpretive predispositions of the institutional, cultural and professional
interpretive communities that endow the text with meaning, for Kelman,
the judge-as-reader is bound by relatively malign interpretive constructs
that either reinforce (if not emanate from) class status, or alternatively,
randomly mediate experience into some sort of articulable and disingenuously rational whole. Either way, though, the judge is at the mercy of
larger forces over which he has little or no control. His purportedly objective, deductive and rational interpretations of texts are either doing the
bidding of the dominant class, or reflecting nonrational filters he has no
power to dispose of. He is not bound by a singular textual meaning, but
he is bound by interpretive, and for the most part, irrational constructs of
which he is only dimly, if that, aware:
[P]articular interpretive construct[s]

...

[may] manifest a simple

class conflict between those protecting the position that the legal system routinely allows them from sudden, incidental disruption, and
those disfavored by the routine distortion of benefits that the legal system generates. Naturally, those disfavored by the ordinary legal distributions of economic power are most prone to use means generally
considered criminal.
Interpretive construction could play very distinct roles in this
class conflict. It is possible that each construction might correspond to
the political program of a social class ....

Alternatively, each legal

result could correspond to the political program of a social group, ...
Finally, it may be that maintaining the appearance of... legal argument is a significant political program of any dominant social class, so
that making formal arguments which do not refer to the unexplainable
interpretations that actually ground the arguments may sometimes be
16. S. FIs H, Introduction, or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Interpretation, in Is
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 14 (1980).

19901

EQUALITY AND THE INTERPRETIVE TURN

463

more vital than maintaining either the construction or particular
results.
...[Alternatively], interpretive constructs... [may not be] politically meaningful at all, but simply inexplicably unpatterned mediators
of experience, the inevitably nonrational filters we need to be able to
perceive or talk at all ....

I speak on behalf of those who no longer

like to listen to people making arguments that mask
a hidden structure
17
of "nonarguments" with insistent, false rigor.
There are two major problems with this radical diminution of the
judge's power in both the postmodem and critical account of interpretation. The first is ethical. The judge whose understanding of the meaning
of the law is determined by communal (Fish) or class (Kelman) constructs is a peculiarly unthinking and non-responsible judge. The judge
can hardly take credit, blame or responsibility for his interpretation of
the constitutional text if the text comes always already interpreted. Nor
can the judge be blamed for skewing meaning in the direction of the status quo if he does so by employing constructs which are by definition
unconscious.
The second, perhaps more serious problem is that both descriptions
seem belied by judicial experience. Adjudication is often felt (or, perhaps, always to some degree felt) to be determinate, and Kelman and
Fish have provided explanations of why this might be so, even in the face
of the radical indeterminacy of legal texts: judicial decisions are indeed
determined, just not by the pre-interpretive original meaning of legal
texts. But their explanations may have overshot the target. The judges
Kelman and Fish posit may be more "determined" than actual judges
feel themselves to be; although judging is felt to be somewhat determined, it is also felt to be somewhat free. The commonsensical account
of judging, in other words, may indeed be the correct one: the judge may
be somewhat bound by "law" as understood by intentionalists, somewhat
bound by legal texts as interpreted by interpretive communities, and
somewhat bound by those texts as interpreted by dominant class interests
and cultural constructs, but he may also be somewhat free and feel himself to be. The judge may at any point have the freedom, if she is sufficiently self-conscious, to break free of these constraints and render an
authentic or novel reading. That judges describe themselves as at least
on occasion possessed of this freedom, and aware of it, is surely some
evidence that they have it. If so, then there is something wrong with any
identification of a constraint on interpretation that describes itself as ex17. Kelman, supra note 15, at 670-71.
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haustive-there are no others-and global-the decision is totally, and
not just somewhat, constrained.
However, both problems-that the interpretivists' descriptions do
violence to both the ethics and experience of judging-are somewhat
cured if we view Fish's and Kelman's descriptions as partial descriptions,
rather than global accounts, of adjudicatory practice. Judges may indeed
be partly constrained by the dominant interpretations bestowed upon
texts by their community, as well as by the interests and desires of dominant classes and cultures. They may also, however, have some degree of
freedom from those constraints-as well as from the constraint of
"law"-to insist upon deviant interpretations, to author novel interpretations, and to break out of class or culture based patterns of thought. Furthermore, only if they have such freedom can we fault them for failing to
exercise it in an ethically responsible way.
And, read as partial rather than global descriptions, both accounts
are underscored rather than undercut by judicial accounts of the experience of judging, and even the appearance of judging. Both
postmodernists and critical scholars, like legal realists before them, have
made it relatively easy for us to identify examples of decisions that purport to be driven by the original, pure, pre-interpreted, intended or plain
meaning of a legal text-whether the Constitution, a statute, or a legal
precedent-but which are in fact driven by other forces-dominant communal meanings or dominant societal and class interests. But it is also
possible to identify judicial decisions that markedly break free of dominant interpretive strategies, interests and desires. That such decisions are
rare speaks to the power of the constraining forces that postmodernists
and critical scholars have identified.18 But that they exist at all belies the
claim that those forces cannot be overcome. When they are, the decision
is all the more exemplary-whether of courage or lawlessness is another
question. But their existence makes clear that in judging as in a range of
other deliberative practices, the genuinely free decision is always a
possibility.
Finally, if we read Kelman's and Fish's descriptions as partial rather
than global, we are free to further the projects they have begun: the identification and exploration of the constraints upon judicial interpretation
of legal documents. Interpretive pluralism, in other words, may be the
most pragmatically sensible scholarly agenda, at least at this point in our
exploration of the consequences of the interpretive turn in legal and con18. Kennedy speaks of Judge Wright's decision in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cit. 1965) in this way. See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 12.

EQUALITY AND THE INTERPRETIVE TURN

465

stitutional studies. It may be that judges are partly constrained by the
interpretive understandings of the communities of which they are a part
and partly constrained by the interests and desires of dominant social
and cultural classes. But even if that's true, they may also be partly constrained by other sorts of forces as well-ethical and professional expectations, for example, or, as I shall argue in the next section,
jurisprudential aspirations stemming from definitional accounts of the
Rule of Law. We should be wary on pragmatic grounds, no less than on
experiential and ethical ones, of adopting accounts of the judicial decision that foreclose those possibilities.
III.

JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS

In addition to the insights recited above, interpretivists in literary
theory have put forward a third postulate that has not received as much
attention in legal circles: that the way a text is identified will go a long
way toward determining its audience, and consequently a long way toward determining its meanings. 19 Inversely, the audience a text captures
will to some degree determine its identity, and hence to some degree its
meaning. This is as true within genres as between them. Thus, to use an
overused example, if we think of Agatha Christie's stories as detective
stories we will tend to ascribe to them meanings which are consistent
with their purpose: to amuse. 20 And, if the audience of Agatha Christie's novels are for the most part casual readers in search of amusement,
we will tend to think of them as detective stories. On the other hand, if
they attract a more "serious" philosophical audience, we may come to
think of them as fictionalized philosophical treatments of death and mortality, and if so, we will find in them very different sorts of meanings.
Similarly, if the audience of children's television consists of children who
need or want to be entertained, we will think of a children's television
cartoon as entertainment and we will accordingly inscribe one set of
meanings; if the audience is children-consumers, we see the text as advertising, and we will inscribe a very different set of meanings. The point is
a simple one: the audience of a text-the community of potential "interpreters" who receives the text-brings to the text a set of needs, desires,
and interests; those needs, desires and interests will determine at least to
19. See, e.g., BARBARA H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
FOR CRITICAL THEORY (1988) for a complete argument to this effect.
20. Ronald Dworkin introduced the Christie example into the legal literature in R. DwORKIN,
How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 150-51 (1985). Fish offers a rejoinder in
Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 559-62

(1982).
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some degree how we categorize it (advertisement, cartoon, detective
story, high literature), and how we categorize it will determine its
meanings.
Surely the same is true of legal texts, and surely the same is true of
the constitutional text. That the Constitution is received for the most
part by judges and lawyers who need to apply and enforce it in courts of
law under established rules of legal procedure, determines to some degree
its identity as a legal text, and that identity determines to some degree its
meaning. Conversely, that the Constitution is now conceived as law
partly determines its professionalized legal and judicial audience. Lawyers and judges have a fairly well-developed sense of the necessary and
sufficient jurisprudential conditions of legalism: what a text must be, in
order to be "law." If the Constitution is identified as law, then it too, no
less than statutes and case law, must meet those minimums. Its interpretive meanings, then, will reflect those jurisprudential constraints.
Courts themselves, and particularly the Supreme Court, make frequent reference to prudential constraints imposed by legalism on their
constitutional decisionmaking. Yet, neither traditional nor interpretivist
constitutionalists, nor the justices themselves, have focused on the jurisprudential constraints on constitutionalism imposed by legalism. Why
the neglect? At least for traditionalists, and to some degree for interpretivists as well, this may be because inquiry has focused instead on the
peculiarity of constitutional thought and reasoning within the legal
genre. 21 Thus, the standard understanding of Marshall's declaration that
"it is a Constitution we are expounding, ' 22 surely has been that we
should understand the uniqueness, the peculiarity, and the differentness
of the Constitution within the universe of law. That it is a Constitution,
rather than a statute or some other more ordinary form of law, undoubtedly imposes constraints on constitutional reasoning that are unique:
constitutional interpretation, unlike other forms of legal interpretation,
must meet enhanced needs for permanence, coherence, integrity and flexibility, simply because we are dealing with a fundamental charter not
made for easy amendment. Perhaps even more important, the uniquely
foundational status of the Constitution has engendered a peculiarly reverential attitude toward it that is not directed toward other legal entities.
Scholarship has, perhaps appropriately, focused on these unique qualities, the unique needs they reflect within a system of constitutional governance, and the meanings the Constitution has acquired because of
21. But see Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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them. 2
Somewhat more surprisingly, postmodern and critical theorists, no
less than traditionalists, also have generally not pursued the possibility
that the philosophical dictates of legalism, rather than prudential constraints, political commitments, class interest, or community understandings, may determine constitutional meaning, although for different
reasons. For postmodernists, the reason may have to do with interdisciplinary politics: postmodern legal theorists, heavily influenced by critical
literary theory, may view their work as an alternative to traditional jurisprudential inquiry, and for that awkward reason alone may be unlikely to
see traditional jurisprudence as a constraint on interpretation. For critical theorists, the reason undoubtedly has to do with politics more simply
defined: critical scholars are committed-perhaps overcommitted-to
the claim that there is no meaningful difference between legal and political discourse. 24 For both reasons, critics and postmodernists will be disinclined to seek out jurisprudential constraints on constitutional
interpretation.
Another reason for the neglect, though, may be that traditional,
postmodern, and critical legal theorists, like the lawyers and judges about
whom they theorize, are insiders to the practice of adjudication. It is far
more difficult to "see" the constraints that define as well as limit one's
own vision than to see constraints on practices that are external to one's
identity. To take a roughly analogous case, a reader who absorbed only
novels would have little reason to consider the definition of the "novel"
as a significant determinant of a particular novel's meaning-although
such a reader may be struck by the definitional constraints of the particularities of the "romance novel" or the "nineteenth-century novel." The
constraints imposed by the novel form itself may-like background
noise-simply become invisible. Likewise, the purely legalist constraints
on the Constitution's meaning may have become similarly invisible, or
faded in contrast to the striking peculiarity and uniqueness of constitutional legalism, to those of us accustomed to viewing the Constitution as
23. For a striking example of constitutional interpretation that focuses almost exclusively on
the specialness and uniqueness of the document, see Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and
Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985) and Perry,
Moral Knowledge. Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A "Naturalist" Perspective, 22 GA. L. REV.
955 (1986).
24. It is often assumed, at least in casual conversation about the consequences of critical legal
theory, that the lack of a distinction between law and politics follows from the indeterminacy claim
alone. It is part of the purpose of this article to show that it does not. From the premise that the
text or original intent of a law lacks a determinate meaning, and hence cannot bind interpretation, it
doesn't follow that nothing binds interpretation. Nor does it follow that legal and political discourses are not distinguishable on grounds other than the determinacy of the former.
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a source of law, and accustomed to (if not "constituted by") the mores
and constraints of the legal universe.
But the differences between the Constitution and other forms of law
should not obscure their family resemblances. The Constitution, because
it is judicially applied law, shares in the general qualities and attributes of
legality. Some of its meaning is accordingly a function of that identification. In the next section, I will examine in detail one example of constitutional interpretation that seems heavily determined by jurisprudential
constraints. There are surely others, however, beyond the contours of
this paper, that could be fruitfully explored.
Judicially interpreted and applied law, for example, for the most
part aspires toward a corrective model of justice: it identifies unjustifiable
wrongs, violated rights, and sets remedies to restore, or correct the status
quo. 25 Courts, as interpreters of law, understand it in such a way as to
make it consonant with this model: a legal norm must specify a wrong
and a right, and provide a remedy accordingly. There is no reason to
think that anything different occurs when the law being read is a Constitution. Surely the "state action" requirement in fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence, as well as the "intent" requirement in equality law, stem
in part from a jurisprudentially motivated need to homogenize the fourteenth amendment with our general conception of the nature of law: both
the state action requirement and the intent requirement may be driven by
the jurisprudential need to insure that a "wrong" has indeed been committed. Similarly, the belabored and apparently "unprincipled" justiciability requirements-standing, case or controversy, and mootnessmight all stem from jurisprudential rather than textual or political constraints: they may all be aimed toward insuring that a right exists and has
been violated. The source of that impulse might be jurisprudential,
rather than political: if the Constitution is law, it must be applied in such
a way as to rectify violated rights and deter wrongdoing. Thus, at least
the state action, intent, and case or controversy requirements might reflect jurisprudential, rather than political or communal constraints on
interpretation.
More generally, and as I have argued elsewhere, 26 the jurisprudential constraints on constitutional interpretation might make radically redistributive understandings of constitutional phrases difficult, and
"conservative" readings-readings that restore or conserve the status
25. This aspect of judicially created law is explored in Sunstein, The Limits of Compensatory
Justice, -

NoMos -

(forthcoming 1991).

26. West, Progressiveand Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 641 (1990).
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quo-seem all the more imperative. The source of this impulse may indeed be, to some degree, a political orientation toward political conservatism, as critical scholars suggest, or alternatively, the dictates of
dominant understandings of the relevant communities, as postmodernists
urge. It might also, however, be rooted in the Court's and courts' institutional identity as interpreters of law. The vast majority of legal actors
understand law as jurisprudentially requiring, by definition, the identification of rights, wrongs and remedies, applied in a way that restores the
pre-injury, or pre-wrong status quo. Most areas of judicially created law
fit this model, and those that clearly do not are for that reason widely
regarded as problematic. Law, at least judicially created and applied
law, is thus itself inherently conservative. There is no reason to think
that we would abandon these understandings of the requirements of law
when faced with the Constitution.
IV.

THE MEANING OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Modern courts and commentators have identified two dramatically
different meanings the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment might have: a substantive meaning (or "substantive equality") and
a formal meaning (or "formal equality"). The formal meaning of equality, or of "equal protection," is that legislators must treat like groups
alike, and the laws they make must reflect this mandate by being "rational."' 27 Thus, if two groups are alike in some relevant respect, a law
may not prescribe different treatment of them. Put somewhat differently,
to meet the formal criterion of equality, the distinctions a law creates
must be rationally related not only to a legitimate end but also to preexisting differences between the affected groups. If a law fails to meet
this standard, then the state has denied "equal protection of the law."
The substantive meaning of equality, or of equal protection, is that
legislators must use law to insure that no social group, such as whites or
men, wrongfully subordinates another social group, such as blacks or women. 28 Thus, if one group wrongfully dominates another-whether economically, physically, socially or sexually-then the legislature must at
least attempt to use legal means to bring an end to that wrongful relation
27. The classical treatment of the formal equality model is Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal
Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.341 (1949). For an argument to the effect that the classical definition is empty of content, see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537,
542, 560-77 (1982).
28. Perhaps the best short account of this view can be found in C. MACKINNON, Sex Equality:
On Difference and Dominance, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215 (1989). See
also Sunstein, supra note 25.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:451

of domination and subordination. For a state to fail to do so is to "deny"
the subordinated group "equal protection of the law."
As numerous commentators have now shown, 29 these two very different meanings of equal protection imply drastically divergent results in
particular cases. 30 Most notably, they imply different results in the major
affirmative action cases of the last few years, from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 3 1 through City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Company.3 2 Under the formal definition, any state differentiation between whites and blacks is prima facie irrational-the two groups are
"alike" for legal purposes and therefore should be treated alike. Race
can't "make a difference." Benign distinctions between races are no
more rational than malicious distinctions. Therefore, and as the Court
clearly held in Croson, affirmative action policies will often be unconstitutional, absent a strong showing of identified past discrimination that
would constitute a difference between the two groups, and hence provide
a justification for differential treatment. 33 Under a substantive definition,
however, affirmative action policies are surely permissible and may even
be required. 34 Whites generally are dominant in this society, blacks are
generally subordinate, and the Equal Protection Clause's antisubordination mandate requires that states undertake affirmative obligations to
equalize the two. Thus, what is clearly prohibited under one interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is clearly permitted and perhaps required under another.
As commentators have also now pointed out, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause over the last few decades
has moved fairly consistently away from a substantive definition and toward a formal definition. 35 Thus, Brown v. Board of Education36 can
readily be read, perhaps must be read, as embracing a substantive account of the Equal Protection Clause: separate and unequal educational
facilities produce unequal educational opportunities, contributing di29. See, e.g., Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, the Empty State, the City of
Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989 (1989); Delgado, On Taking Back Our
Civil Rights Promises: When EqualityDoesn't Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579; Rosenfeld, Decoding
Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L.

REV. 1729 (1989); Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935
(1989) [hereinafter Taming of Brown]; Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness,1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99,
104-05.
30. I discuss this contrast in greater detail in West, supra note 26.
31. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
32. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
33. Id. at 492-93 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
34. See Strauss, Taming of Brown, supra note 29.
35. See supra note 29.
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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rectly to the subordination of blacks and dominance of whites in an already white-dominated society. a7 By Bakke, however, the meaning of
both the Equal Protection Clause and Brown had changed dramatically.
At least according to Justice Powell, the Equal Protection Clause does
not require an end to subordination, but rather, requires that likes be
treated alike. 38 Furthermore, blacks and whites are, for all purposes that
matter, alike, and any segregatory scheme-whether "equal" or "unequal," and whatever its impact on the dominance or subordination of one
race vis-A-vis the other-treats the two groups differently and is hence
presumptively unconstitutional. Such a rule includes, although is not
limited to, benign affirmative action plans as well as maliciously segregated school systems. Thus, by Bakke, the substantive, antisubordinationist meaning of Brown had begun to erode as it came to be possible to
read the clause as conveying only a formal, antidiscrimination meaning.
By Croson, the transformation was complete. Far from requiring raceconscious dismantling of institutional and social subordination of blacks,
a more united as well as more conservative Court held that the fourteenth amendment presumptively prohibits most race-conscious decisionmaking, absent strong evidentiary showings of past discrimination.
Affirmative action aimed at ending subordination is not only not required
9
by the fourteenth amendment, it is prohibited by it.
How did the modem Croson Court arrive at this interpretation not
only of Brown, but of the fourteenth amendment as well? Was the Court
free, either at the time of Croson or earlier, to simply choose between
formal or substantive meanings of equality? Does the transition from the
substantive interpretation at least arguably embraced by Brown to the
rejection of substantive equality and embrace of formalism in Croson reflect nothing but the changing political views of the changing personnel
on the Court?
There are at least four answers to that question worth exploring.
The later Croson Court might have been "bound by law" in the way
meant by traditionalists: the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection
Clause has some discoverable original or plain meaning which either permits, requires or prohibits affirmative action. If so, then the earlier substantive interpretation of the clause was simply "wrong," and the
modem formal interpretation is "right" (or vice versa). 4 0 Second, the
37. See Strauss, Taming of Brown, supra note 29.
38. 438 U.S. at 315-20.
39. 488 U.S. at 493.
40. For a similar argument to this effect from an intentionalist perspective, see Knapp &
Michaels, Intention, Identity and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy (unpublished manu-
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Court might have been (and might be) genuinely free to choose between
them. If so, then the formal interpretation now governing the clause is
not so much "right" or "wrong," as a "good" or "bad" political choice,
and the justices' decision to adopt it should be evaluated accordingly.4 '
And third, as the postmodernists and critical scholars might contend, it
might be that the "law"-the text, the history and the intent of the drafters of the clause-is indeed too indeterminate to mandate either a substantive or a formal interpretation. On this account the justices moved
toward a formal definition and away from a substantive account because
of the constraints identified by interpretivists: the interpretive habits of
the relevant communities and the interests and desires of dominant social
groups. The fourth possibility, and the one for which I will argue, is that
the move toward formalism in equal protection doctrine, whether or not
it represents class interest or communal morality, also reflects constraints
on interpretation that stem from the legal status of the Constitution
itself.
As for the first choice, and as interpretivists (both new pragmatists
and critical scholars) would surely insist, the "law," understood as either
the plain meaning or the originally intended meaning of a legal text, at
least in this context, did not determine outcome. The plain meaning of
the text of the Equal Protection Clause provides no help; either of these
interpretations are linguistically permissible understandings of the phrase
"equal protection of the law." Nor does the history of the fourteenth
amendment yield a clear choice in favor of one or the other of these two
radically conflicting interpretations, for two reasons. First, both may
have been within the original intent of the drafters. It may have been
understood that the way to achieve substantive equality between the
races was to insist upon formal equality from state legislators. The two
meanings may not have been perceived as in tension, so that the possibility of their coming into conflict (or even being truly differentiated) and
thus requiring a choice may never have been raised. Second, the history
of the clause's application in fourteenth amendment doctrine provides
ample precedential authority for the Court to adopt either interpretation.42 Although the formal meaning of equality has tended to dominate,
the Court from time to time has embraced the contrasting substantive
script on file with author) (arguing that from an intentionalist perspective, Brown was correctly
decided).
41. Mark Tushnet remains the best critical constitutional scholar from this theoretical perspective. See M. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 70-107.
42. A good short treatment of both the history of the amendments and their judicial interpreta-

tion as supportive of an antisubordination or anti-subjugation principle can be found in L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21 (2d ed. 1988).
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understanding of the Constitution's mandate. 43
As interpretivists would insist, then, at least with respect to fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, neither the text itself nor its authors'
intent nor the history of its application provide any absolute constraint
on judicial interpretation. The Court could embrace either a formal or
substantive understanding of equality, striking or upholding affirmative
action plans accordingly, and be well within the accepted boundaries of
its own discretion. The "law," as conventionally understood, provides
no answer. If we understand "law" as meaning constraints imposed
upon judicial decisions through the intended, historical or plain meanings of legal texts, then the "law" of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause truly is indeterminate. Whatever does constrain the
decision, if anything, it is not "law."
Second, the indeterminacy of the phrase might of course imply that
the judge is free to simply choose, on the basis of "his own values," his
own politics, whim, or any other variant of subjective desire, whichever
interpretation he pleases. If so, then, as traditionalists fear, those opinions reflecting a substantive interpretation of the phrase stem from their
authors' desire, for whatever reason, to promote the substantive equality
of blacks and whites, and those reflecting a formal interpretation stem
from their authors' desire, again for whatever reason, to promote only a
formal equality, and often at the expense of meaningful progress toward
substantive racial justice. 44 In Croson, the Rehnquist Court unsurprisingly chose to promote formal equality; in Brown, the Warren Court
chose to promote substantive equality. Evaluation and criticism of both
decisions, on this account, should proceed on the basis of whether the
Court in each instance chose wisely, not whether it decided correctly.
There is, though, at least one problem with this account. The degree
of freedom it posits is wildly at odds with the language of the decisions
themselves, and presumably with the experience of judging as well. Virtually none of the significant cases marking the transition from substantive to formal interpretations of equality reads as though they derive
from unfettered choice. Whatever the outcome and whatever the judge,
the decisions are written in the language of obligation and necessity, not
in the language of free choice. To take just two examples, Justice Scalia,
in Croson, first explains the ethical or political basis of his choice for
43. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
44. See generally R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 74-84 (1990).
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formal over substantive equality. He then quickly proceeds, however, to
describe his decision in obligatory terms:
The benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages,
whether they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or
otherwise can no more be pursued by the illegitimate means of racial
discrimination than can other assertedly benign purposes we have repeatedly rejected. The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating
from our society the source of those effects, which is the tendencyfatal to a nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and women
on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin. A
solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no solution
at all. I share the view expressed by Alexander Bickel that "the lesson
of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the samefor at least a generation: discrimination

on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional,
inherently
'45
wrong, and destructive of democratic society."
Justice O'Connor, reaching the same result, but with very different reasoning, also ultimately employs language of obligation:
That Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide
discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate
.... To hold otherwise would be to cede control over the content of

the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 state legislatures and their myriad political subdivisions .... We believe that such a result would be
contrary to the intentions of the Framersof the FourteenthAmendment,

who desired to place clear limits on the States' use of race as a criterion
for legislative
46 action, and to have the federal courts enforce those
limitations.

The justices themselves, if we can take the language of the opinions seriously, understand the interpretive task as requiring a correct outcome in
the equality cases as in others, and not as requiring a wise political or
personal choice.
The third possibility, of course, is that although the text of the fourteenth amendment itself as well as its history is indeterminate, the modem Court is nevertheless "bound" to the formal interpretation, but it is
bound not by law, but by extra-textual influences. The question, then, is
what those influences might be. One possibility, presumably that of the
post-modernists, is that the contemporary Court's adoption of the formal
interpretation of equal protection was determined by the pre-existing
habits, interests, values and desires of the most powerful forces within
the "interpretive community" that imbued the text with meaning. A sec45. 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 490-91 (emphasis added).
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ond possibility, presumably that of the critical scholars, is that the
Court's adoption of the formal interpretation was determined by pre-existing "interpretive constructs" which emanate from the Court's-and
the social sectors' of which it is representative-willingness to tolerate
47
institutional and unconscious racism.
Both explanations have considerable merit. Indeed, the use in
Croson of the fourteenth amendment to strike state and municipal action
intended to aid minorities goes a long way toward vindicating the longstanding critical claim, first made by Alan Freeman, that the main function of "antidiscrimination law" in this culture is to legitimate through
formalism the deep-seated and impenetrable substantive racism of the
dominant white race. 48 In Croson, and more ambiguously in Bakke
before it, the main tool of antidiscrimination law-the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-was used quite explicitly to invalidate substantive measures taken to ameliorate the effects of racial
subordination. Indeed the Court's explicit holding-that for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment, the eradication of the effects of racial subordination is not a compelling state goal-is virtually an explicit avowal of
the subconscious or unconscious legitimating motive ascribed by Freeman to the entire body of antidiscrimination law.
Postmodernist explanations of judicial interpretation also have some
appeal in this context. It seems entirely fair to say that the Court in
Croson embraced the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment that
currently dominates in the legal and nonlegal culture. To be sure, there
are competing interpretations of equality and of equal protection currently circulating from which the Court could have drawn. 49 But if it is
true, as the postmodernists claim, that the text comes always already
interpreted, there's little doubt that at this point in our history of race
relations, the interpretation in which it comes always already embedded
is that of formal equality-a colorblind and mechanistic aspiration that if
the states are rigorously neutral in their lawmaking, and we simply let
the economic, political and cultural chips fall where they may, racial fairness will be the outcome.
Even if the decision in Croson to definitively embrace formal equality at the cost of substantive equality was partly determined by interest
and community, however, there surely may have been other constraining
determinants as well. Specifically, there may have been jurisprudential
47. See, e.g., Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
(D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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48. Id.
49. See supra note 29.
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constraints on the Court that made the formal interpretation of equality
more palatable than the substantive. Not just the politics, but also the
aspiration of the formal equality the Court mandated in Croson readily
converges with the Court's peculiarly jurisprudential identity, in a way in
which the aspiration of substantive equality does not. The Supreme
Court, like all appellate courts, aspires toward formal justice in the cases
that come before it. The Court, like any court exercising its appellate
power, must decide whether the case facing it is sufficiently like an earlier
case that the outcome should be identical, or whether it can be rationally
distinguished. Appellate jurisprudence is almost entirely concerned with
doing formal justice to litigants: like cases should be treated alike; like
individuals should be treated alike. If the case can be closely analogized
to an earlier case or line of cases, then its outcome should be subsumed
under a general principle that rationalizes both. This jurisprudential and
ethical goal-like treatment of like cases-defines the justice toward
which appellate courts aim, thereby defines the reasoning they employ,
and finally, given the prominence of appellate cases in legal education,
defines the essence of legal thinking itself.
It is not unreasonable to speculate that the centrality of the task of
defining or discovering "likeness" or "difference" to the traditional judicial role has influenced the definition judicially accorded the constitutional mandate and ethical aspiration of "equal protection." To be
treated equally by an appellate court means, simply, that one is treated
the same as those who are relevantly similar, and differently from those
who are different. To a considerable degree, then, the word "equal," to
use the language of the postmodernists, comes always already interpreted
to the legally trained mind as meaning the like treatment of like cases,
and the disparate treatment of the relevantly different. The interpretive
constraint derives not so much from competing cultural meanings as
from jurisprudential identity: courts exist to assure "equality before the
law." The equality thereby assured is rigorously formal: likes will be
treated alike.
It is not surprising then that the "equality" mandated by the Equal
Protection Clause has ultimately come to be understood by the Supreme
Court as requiring a formal rather than substantive interpretation. The
formal meaning of equal protection embraced by the Court in Croson is
simply the "equal justice" mandate applied to the legislative treatment of
groups, rather than the judicial treatment of individuals. Legislators,
under the Court's reading of equal protection, must treat like groups
alike, just as courts, in their appellate function, must assure that laws are
applied in such a way as to treat similarly situated individuals similarly.
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If two groups are substantially or relevantly the same, then they must be
treated the same; any law that differentiates between them is presumptively irrational. Blacks and whites are "the same" with respect to their
innate entitlement to government largesse. A law that differentiates between races is therefore as irrational as a court that draws an unjustified
distinction between cases. Furthermore, given our history of malicious
discrimination, such irrationality is, in turn, presumptively maliciouslyrather than randomly or whimsically-motivated.
As the Court has itself from time to time acknowledged-most notably in Washington v. Davis 5 0-a formal rather than substantive reading
of the Equal Protection Clause is in part mandated by the prudential
constraints on the Court's jurisprudential role. A substantive definition
of equal protection requires, the Court has argued, more judicial intervention into the private, social and cultural spheres than is feasible. But
a formal reading of the Equal Protection Clause converges not only with
the Court's sense of its own prudential limits, but also with its sense of its
aspirational jurisprudential function. Through their appellate work,
courts assure rational application of laws. The Equal Protection Clause,
read formally rather than substantively, requires the same rationality of
legislatures with respect to groups that the mandate of formal justice requires of courts with respect to individuals. A formal reading of the
Equal Protection Clause thus meets the Court's peculiarly jurisprudential, ethical and aspirational goals, as well as its prudential interests and
conservative politics.
If the Court's reading of equal protection as requiring formal rather
than substantive equality stems in part from ethical constraints with their
origins in jurisprudence, then it also seems reasonable to assume that
other political or legal actors, not constrained in the same way, might
read the clause in a very different way. History to some extent bears this
out: in its sole major interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, the
nineteenth-century Civil Rights Act, 5' Congress interpreted its provisions substantively rather than formally, reading it to prohibit acts of
private subordination by whites of blacks, and mandating that law be
used in some fashion to end such subordination. 52 This sharp difference
between the congressional interpretation and the interpretation insisted
50. 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (prudential constraints on Court's powers of enforcement
make implausible an expansive reading of equal protection clause that would invalidate state action
with adverse impact on suspect class).
51. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114,18 Stat. 336.
52. See generallyJ. TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192-95 (1951).

478

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:451

upon by the Supreme Court at the time53 undoubtedly reflected the differing political commitments of the two bodies. But it may also have
reflected, then and now, different institutional aspirations. Congress, as
the originator of legal change, is not constrained by jurisprudential, compensatory, corrective or formal norms of justice; its role is not to apply
laws equally to groups or individuals before it. It is logical to assume,
then, that its interpretations of the constitutional provisions that control
its deliberations will not reflect those constraints. Congressional interpretation of the Constitution is, though, constrained by distributive and
substantive norms of justice: the laws it enacts should distribute resources fairly among the citizenry. Its understanding of the "equality,"
then, which the Equal Protection Clause guarantees and which it is directed to ensure under section five of the fourteenth amendment, should
be informed by a distributive and substantive ethical ideal, rather than a
corrective and formal one.
Were Congress to once again take up its section five responsibilities
under the fourteenth amendment, and enact legislation for the purpose of
ensuring that the states provide equal protection of the laws, it would
have to first interpret the meaning of that phrase. The interpretive turn,
if it has done nothing else, has reaffirmed the legal realists' basic insight
that the application or enforcement of a text necessarily first requires its
interpretation. If the preceding analysis is correct, it would seem sensible
to predict that congressional interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, grounded in Congressional rather than judicial needs, interests,
and institutional aspirations, would be quite different than that of the
Supreme Court. It would minimally be freed of the constraint of jurisprudential ethics that at least in part dictates a formal rather than substantive reading of the Equal Protection Clause. It would instead,
presumably, operate under a constraint of distributive rather than compensatory justice. Such a constraint might, in turn, render a substantive,
rather than formal, interpretation of equality considerably more likely.
As various commentators have argued, and as I have discussed at
length elsewhere, 54 such a reading would support not only federal affirmative action plans such as that sustained in Fullilove,.5 but an array of
other "equality-promoting" legislative proposals as well, including, for
example, child care funding and comparable worth legislation as protective of substantive gender equality, and greater funding for education,
53. See Civil Rights Act Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
54. See West, supra note 26.
55. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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social services and law enforcement in inner cities as protective of substantive race equality. Whether the Supreme Court would uphold such
legislation against attacks grounded in formal interpretations of the
Equal Protection Clause is of course a separate question.5 6 But congressional grounding of equality-promoting legislation in a substantive, congressional interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, rather than in
the now standard commerce clause guise, would at least help to clarify
the ethical and aspirational purpose of congressional action.
V.

CONCLUSION

The interpretive turn in legal philosophy has sensitized legal scholars to the malleability of texts and the consequent inevitability of interpretation. Because of insights garnered from interpretive and
hermeneutic disciplines, we are more aware of the difficulty of locating
constraints on legal interpretation of texts in their plain meaning or the
original intent of their authors. Unfortunately, however, the political dimension of the interpretive turn in legal studies has truncated its value:
because of the apparent consequences of the indeterminacy claim for our
commitment to the separation of powers, debate in constitutional scholarship over the importance of the interpretive turn has centered on the
basic question of whether the plain meaning or the originally intended
meaning of a text can constrain later application of the legal text. The
follow-up question-what additional constraints might consist of, and
what the implications might be of those constraining influences for constitutional meanings-has received relatively short shrift.
Hermeneutic scholars in other disciplines, however, have as much to
say about the second question as about the first. Two such additional
constraints on all interpretation is the identity of the text-what sort of
text it is-and the identity of the interpreter-withwhat sort of interests,
desires, needs and aspirations. Although legal theorists have not given as
much attention to these constraints as have literary theorists, they are of
obvious relevance to legal interpretation. The Constitution is a legal text
interpreted by judges, and as such, it acquires meanings quite different
than those it might have were it understood as a political text interpreted
by legislators, or a moral and aspirational text interpreted by citizens.
First, as the Court itself has from time to time noted, its meaning must be
compatible with prudential constraints on adjudication-what sorts of
remedies are available to judges, what sorts of cases can be heard, etc.
But second, and perhaps more importantly, its meaning must also reso56. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) suggests that it should.
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nate with the aspirational goals of adjudication, as well as with the prudential constraints of adjudicative forums. One such aspirational goal is
surely the goal of legal justice. Courts seek to do formal justice-to treat
like cases alike-in virtually every case that comes before them. All
law-common, statutory and constitutional-must be applied in such a
way that litigants similarly situated are similarly treated, and those differently situated are rationally distinguished.
Since the Constitution is also a form of law, this aspirational goal
has undoubtedly influenced the Court's understanding of its substantive
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause. A formal interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause resonates deeply with the Court's, as
with any court's, ethical commitment to legal justice: the clause requires
legislators to treat like groups alike and courts to oversee, in a quasiappellate manner, their performance in doing so. A substantive interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, does not, and may be
felt as conflicting with legal justice aspirations. It does not follow, however, that the formal interpretation of equality is right and the substantive interpretation wrong. It only follows that so long as the Court
remains the exclusive, as well as ultimate, interpreter of constitutional
meaning, substantive interpretations of the equality clause will continue
to run against the grain.
There is no reason, however, for the Court to become, to be, or to
remain the exclusive as well as ultimate interpreter of the fourteenth
amendment. The amendment itself directs Congress to play an active
role in bringing its guarantees to fruition. If the interpretive turn has
taught us anything, it has taught us that the implementation of a legal
text invariably requires its interpretation. The question is not, then,
whether Congress should interpret as well as enforce fourteenth amendment guarantees; if it is to enforce, it must interpret. The only question
is how it will do so. To answer that question, two facts are worth noting.
First, as at least the Court often acknowledges, Congress operates under
dramatically different prudential constraints than the Supreme Court.
But second, it also operates under dramatically different aspirational constraints: it seeks to do distributive rather than legal justice; it prioritizes
the "good" over the right; it seeks to enact laws wisely rather than apply
them correctly. Those aspirations, no less than prudential and political
constraints on its decisions, would undoubtedly affect the meaning of
whatever constitutional provisions Congress sets out to interpret. Therefore, when and if Congress takes up again its section five obligations
under the fourteenth amendment, we can expect to see a dramatically
different meaning of equality emerge from its efforts.

